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Organisations involved in delivering international democracy assistance are engaging increasingly with 
questions about how to assess their activities. A double shift in the terms of reference, from the ex post 
evaluation of assistance projects or programmes to ex ante appraisal of the broader democracy promotion 
strategies, could make democracy promotion more effective. This does not mean abandoning the former; 
on the contrary its status would be enhanced. Improving the chain of learning that leads from assistance 
evaluations to the formulation of promotion strategies could improve decision-making over how and 
whether to promote democracy abroad. Because strategies for democracy promotion are constitutive of 
the political relationship with countries, different strategies have different implications for the possibilities 
of political self-determination. For that reason and because democratisation and hence effective democracy 
promotion may be beneficial for human development, international peace and national security, 
strategies that reflect informed appraisal would be an improvement on a defective status quo. The 
challenges include: more systematic data gathering; innovative ways of comparing the various democracy 
promotion options; and institutional changes that connect the research findings to the high politics of 
policy-making. 
International democracy promotion has become an increasingly prominent activ-
ity. Significant efforts are currently under way to evaluate more rigorously the 
results of one particular version of democracy promotion, namely past projects 
and programmes in democracy assistance. However, to achieve the greatest 
possible benefit from these efforts the findings should be linked to a fuller, more 
systematic approach to comparing all the various ways of promoting democracy. 
The point of giving more attention to appraising democracy promotion is to 
inform decisions on democracy promotion strategy in advance. After first pro-
viding reasons why a more effective approach to promoting democracy is desir-
able, referring to the goals, major actors and limitations in the state of the art, the 
analysis then explores the politics of a double shift, from ex post to ex ante 
assessment and from democracy assistance to democracy promotion. Subsequent 
sections explain why this is a formidable yet feasible challenge. They also 
acknowledge how difficult it is to accommodate the appealing proposition that 
assessments themselves should function as vehicles for democratisation by 
employing participatory approaches, while recognising that democratic reform 
must be an exercise in national political self-determination. 
Why Democracy Promotion? 
International support for promoting democracy has increased substantially over 
the last two decades, and reported democracy assistance is now in excess of US$5 
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billion dollars annually. The US government and the European Union (EU) are 
well-established actors and March 2006 saw the inauguration of the United 
Nations Democracy Fund: 26 countries pledged an initial sum of $41 million, for 
distribution through other United Nations (UN) organisations. Meanwhile the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) claims to be the largest 
spender on democratic governance, amounting to US$1.4 billion in 2005. All 
these figures refer only to expenditures on projects and programmes that have 
been categorised as democracy or democracy related. They do not reflect the 
much larger cost of the many other ways in which democratic objectives are 
promoted, such as through diplomacy and political forms of action that extend 
right up to attempted coercion. 
The case for promoting democracy has been much rehearsed. Aside from what 
readers might believe is democracy’s intrinsic desirability and, if the ‘democratic 
peace’ thesis is valid, the possibility that a world of democracies would be a world 
at peace, more mundane arguments cite the economic well-being and welfare of 
societies that experience democratisation. Take for instance the United Nations’ 
Millenium Development Goals (MDGs). 
Nowhere do the MDGs mention democracy. And yet the UNDP’s Human 
Development Report 2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World (UNDP, 
2002, p. v) proclaimed itself to be primarily about the idea that politics is as 
important as economics to successful development. Where the goal is human 
development, defined as the promotion of the freedom, well-being and dignity of 
people, democratic participation is deemed a critical end, not just a means.No less a 
figure than Mark Malloch Brown (2006, p. 20), Administrator of the UNDP 1999–
2005 and currently Chef de Cabinet of UN Secretary-General KofiAnnan, has 
argued that ‘Assisting countries in their efforts to confront the challenges of 
democratization lies at the core of the UNDP’s work’. In fact, contrary to the 
original idea that developing countries face what Jagdish Bhagwati (1966) called 
a ‘cruel dilemma’, which meant they could pursue either economic development 
or democracy but could not prioritise both, more recent thinking reconciles 
democracy and ‘good governance’ with the sustained economic development that 
is essential to attaining the MDGs. Bhagwati subsequently revised his earlier view, 
as social scientific understanding of the relationship between the type of political 
regime and development underwent a double paradigm shift. It moved away from 
economic determinism and the suspicion that if regimes do influence develop-
ment then authoritarian polities have certain advantages, towards a conviction 
that political institutions make a difference and in the long run democracies 
possibly do it better. 
 
Larger debates over the comparative economic performance of democratic and 
authoritarian regimes remain unresolved. But many international development 
agencies now behave as if movement towards democratic governance can be 
positive. That does not mean all non-democracies now receive less aid, or that all 
democratising countries are being rewarded with more aid. However, they know 
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that political shocks such as military coups and civil war greatly harm economic 
growth, and they do appear to punish countries for ‘de-democratisation’ (Headey, 
2006, p. 7). And if we assume that development aid is normally beneficial then 
those countries’ chances of enjoying the MDGs will diminish. Aid volatility itself 
significantly reduces aid’s value. The evidence that development aid increases the 
rate of human development more in democracies than in autocracies (Kosack, 
2003, p. 14) also supports the view that democratisation should be encouraged. 
Of course some aid analysts claim that development aid inflicts harm, in a similar 
manner to the oil resource curse. They say that where aid reduces the tax burden 
society is less interested in securing governmental accountability and political 
representation. They say it can undermine state capacity by increasing corruption 
and rent seeking by officials and politicians. Executive dominance is increased. If 
these criticisms are true then they add further weight to the developmental case 
for external actors to try to promote democracy, in order to counter aid’s harmful 
side-effects. 
While the actual policy drivers behind international democracy promotion 
remain a matter of conjecture, the actors currently engaged in this activity 
span a range from intergovernmental organisations such as the European Union 
and United Nations to government departments and quasi- and even non-
governmental actors, many of them funded almost entirely by government but 
some of them claiming complete independence. Prominent actors in the US are 
the government’s Agency for International Development (USAID), whose Office 
of Democracy and Governance oversaw $1.2 billion of spending on electoral 
support, civil society strengthening, media development and human rights in 
2004, and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) ,founded in 1983. The 
NED describes itself as a private, non-profit organisation. It enjoys an annual 
congressional appropriation.It provides direct support to civic groups and political 
parties overseas as well as through grants to its four core institutes, of which the 
National Democratic Institute (NDI) and International Republican Institute 
(IRI) are especially well known. In Europe the Netherlands Institute for 
Multiparty Democracy (IMD), established in 2000 as ‘an organisation of political 
parties for political parties’, is funded by the Dutch government. In Britain the 
Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD) describes itself as an independent 
public body sponsored by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Established in 
1992 it too focuses on parties and civil society. Germany’s political foundations 
(Stiftungen) have the longest experience of working with political actors in other 
countries and are increasingly engaged in democracy assistance activities. Their 
combined income from the federal government dwarfs that of other European 
counterparts. Such is the number and variety of organisations that nowadays have 
some sort of involvement in promoting democracy that notjust the resources but 
the mandates, legal restrictions and access to specific tools or instruments differ 
greatly among them. Hence they avail themselves of different approaches. Thus 
whereas military intervention might be used by war/defence ministries to topple 
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an autocratic regime, and the UN deploys peacekeeping/enforcing forces to create 
a stable environment for democratic peace building after civil conflict, the 
specialised democracy foundations concentrate on practical democracy projects, 
such as offering political training, advice and material support. 
Regardless of the type of organisation, an effective strategy for promoting democ-
racy is more worthwhile than an ineffective strategy or no strategy at all. That 
means working out an appropriate choice of means to secure the sought-after 
end.1 Indeed, if, as is claimed by Steven Radelet et al. (2005, p. 16), aid interven-
tions aimed at securing democratic reform, while ultimately positive for devel-
opment, do not produce their economic dividends quickly, then it is important to 
establish in advance which strategic choices are likely to deliver most on their 
political promise. The longer it takes to determine the most effective approach to 
supporting democratic progress, the longer will be the lead time before the full 
developmental benefits can materialise. This is especially true if, as Steven Finkel 
et al. (2006, p. 60) claim in regard to USAID, the cumulative democratic dividend 
from democracy support is a lagged effect. That compounds the delay before 
democratisation produces developmental benefits. 
To help minimise the likelihood of such a double drag, then, the efforts recently 
initiated by democracy assistance practitioners to improve their evaluation of 
democracy assistance activities must be welcomed.2 Attempts to assess the state of 
democracy are far from new, but sustained attempts to go beyond identifying the 
outputs of democracy assistance projects or programme and accountancy-style 
audits of expenditure to assessing their effectiveness and impact are relatively 
recent. The significant methodological and other problems outlined by Andrew 
Green and Richard Kohl (2007) help explain the tardiness. 
Yet even these endeavours do not go far enough, particularly in respect of what 
the governmental and intergovernmental democracy promotion actors could be 
doing, for two main reasons. First, the investigations so far have largely concerned 
democracy assistance, such as practical support to the electoral process, strengthening 
civil society and horizontal mechanisms of executive accountability like the 
judiciary. But democracy assistance is only one of the instruments, tools or 
approaches that democracy promotion uses to promote democracy. So, even a 
sound methodology that is well executed would provide at best only partial 
information. Second, the evaluations dwell on past performance. They become 
worthwhile only when the knowledge and understanding gained from analysing 
what works and what does not work, and under what conditions, feeds into the 
making of future policy. This is where appraisal differs: appraisal provides an 
analysis on which decisions to do things are based; it is a planning tool, logically 
prior to the making and remaking of policy, or policy revision (Carlsson et al., 
1994, p. 11; Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, 2004, p. 
103). 
For two reasons then there needs to be a double shift in the terms of reference: 
from the evaluation (ex post assessment) of democracy assistance projects and 
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programmes, to the appraisal (ex ante assessment) of the broader democracy 
promotion strategies. Democracy assistance is but one means to an end; the value 
of doing assessment derives from connecting it to the larger purpose. That means 
thinking about how to compare the likely performance of different approaches to 
promoting democracy, which means the instruments or tools, as well as trying to 
measure the record of democracy assistance, namely activities already undertaken. 
For policy deliberations to benefit, an enabling institutional environment must 
exist as well. 
The argument as it is developed below is confined to political strategies for 
promoting democracy abroad. Logically it could be extended to economic strategies 
such as those that aim to establish the economic ‘conditions’ or ‘preconditions’ of 
democratisation. However that would make modelling the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of what are fundamentally very different ways of trying to promote 
democracy even more complex, as well as invite debate over whether variables like 
social equality are part of democracy, a consequence of democracy or part of 
democracy’s conditions instead. 
The State of the Art 
Considerable concern has been expressed on both sides of the Atlantic that 
strategic thinking concerning how to promote democracy has been weak. In the 
democracy promotion organisations and at senior political levels this is now 
coming to be recognised. Part of the reason is a growing belief that the easy 
victories for democracy promotion and for democratisation more generally have 
been won. Extending democracy to remaining countries, or even just preventing 
its erosion, will be more difficult. A willingness to commit more public money to 
promoting democracy supplies another ground, and is fuelled by notions that 
democratisation can contribute to fighting the ‘war on terror’. 
The evidence for claiming dissatisfaction with the state of the art of policy-
making towards democracy promotion is not hard to find. For example criticisms 
of the EU’s European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) and 
its Euro-Med Partnership or Barcelona Process for not actually furthering 
democracy have been widely voiced. RichardYoungs for instance noted a ‘lack of 
overarching “systematic thinking”’ (Youngs, 2003, p. 131), ‘arbitrary accidental-
ism’ (Youngs, 2004, p. 13) and a palpable disconnect between EU democracy 
assistance and the high politics instruments of democracy promotion. A recent 
report commissioned by the European Parliament calls for a ‘more “upfront” and 
strategic approach to democracy and human rights support’ (Netherlands Institute 
for Multiparty Democracy [NIMD], 2005, p. 30). Overall, EU policies ‘are widely 
judged to have fallen short of fulfilling their potential’ (NIMD, 2005, p. 14), 
notwithstanding the ‘unparalleled potential for coordinating and integrating different 
policy instruments’ such as trade, diplomacy, development assistance and security policy 
tools, as well as separate member state efforts (NIMD, 2005, p. 12). 
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The EU must go ‘beyond simply assessing whether individual projects have 
fulfilled their internal objectives’ (NIMD, 2005, p. 26). And although the EU is 
widely credited with having furthered political reform in those Central and 
Eastern European countries that were required to meet and have now met the 
EU’s 1993 Copenhagen criteria for membership, the relevance to future strategy 
is questionable. Judith Kelley (2006, p. 49) for example expresses reservations 
about the ‘mechanical borrowing’ of the template of conditionality and sociali-
sation from the enlargement process and its application to the very different 
situation of the countries in the European Neighbourhood. Perhaps it is hardly 
surprising that Edward McMillan Scott, who is Vice-President of the European 
Parliament and chair of its Democracy Caucus, says the EU ‘needs a new strategic 
approach to democracy and human rights’ (cited in Institute for Multiparty 
Democracy, 2006).As for the democracy promotion policies of individual states, 
a 2006 survey of seven EU member states as well as the EU Commission, Council 
and Parliament establishes that many are still at a very preliminary stage in 
strategic thinking and commit few personnel to the task (Youngs, 2006). 
In the United States Thomas Carothers (1997; 2004) has repeatedly argued that 
the actors need to adopt a more strategic approach while at the same time 
explaining why this has been slow to emerge. In 2006 the US State Department 
and USAID together with the intelligence community began to initiate a thor-
oughgoing consideration of how to promote democracy, and revealed some 
sharply divided opinions (as reported in Dinmore and Stafford, 2006). Just as in 
Europe, political demands by a comparatively small number of legislators are part 
of the background to this, with motives that appear to vary from a genuine 
concern to see democracy promoted more successfully to worries about wasteful 
public spending and the potential for harming other foreign policy goals. A keen 
interest in rigorously evaluating USAID democracy support is now part of this 
ferment. Thus although Finkel et al. ’s (2006) evaluation was confident that a 
statistically significant positive relationship exists,3 it was intended to be but the 
first stage in a more in-depth programme of analysis. The study also contrasted 
the absence of comparable data for other major donors and urged them to 
undertake similar research. A separate investigation into the international influences 
on democratisation with a particular interest in the role of democracy promotion 
is to be led by the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law at 
Stanford University. 
 
Finally, private communications with personnel involved in democracy promotion 
confirm what has also been said in public: not only do we need more credible 
information about what kinds of assistance work and in what circumstances, but 
we cannot be confident that the insights travel upwards in the decision-making 
hierarchy, rather than simply gathering dust. For example, despite receiving 
contrasting reports, the second one more favourable than the first, both the WFD 
and IMD were criticised in recent institutional evaluations for either not doing 
enough self-evaluation or for treating assessment as an end in 
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itself (River Path Associates, 2005; European Centre for Development Policy 
Management, 2005, respectively). If shortcomings like this exist within individual 
organisations then how much more likely are they to characterise the lines of 
communication between organisations as different as political foundations and 
the government departments that sponsor them, and the private external con-
sultants who sometimes execute the assessments? If Green and Kohl (2007) with 
their US ‘insider’ experience can say that many donors feel there is a breakdown 
in the feedback from assistance evaluations to assistance programming, then how 
much more likely are there to be gaps between such evaluations and the larger 
consideration of alternative approaches to promoting democracy where assistance 
provides just one option, in other words future policy appraisal? The questions are 
of course rhetorical. In the EU’s case an answer can be found in the 2005 report 
commissioned by the Parliament (NIMD, 2005, p. 14, emphasis in original): ‘A 
common and well documented area of concern in all Commission programmes 
is the weak link between programming and political analysis’. 
Politics of Democracy Promotion 
Democracy assistance, which consists of the concessionary and, usually, consensual 
provision of practical, advisory, technical and financial support through projects 
and programmes, is not the only game in town. The instruments, tools or 
approaches that are associated with efforts to promote democracy abroad are 
wide-ranging and can be described or categorised in a number of ways. Thus we 
could make use of Joseph Nye’s (2005) distinction between ‘soft’ and ‘hard 
power’, the former being the ability to get what you want through attraction, and 
the latter employing coercion or payments. Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way 
(2005) offer an alternative typology: ‘leverage’ and ‘linkage’. Leverage plays on 
governments’ vulnerability to external pressure; linkage operates via general ‘ties 
to the West’. A more flexible way of capturing the diversity rests on the idea of a 
continuum expressing different gradations of power, where power is understood 
as an umbrella concept that contains non-coercive ways of exercising influence at 
one end and physical coercion at the other. In the context of democracy 
promotion the middle ground is occupied by a cluster of more or less coercive 
relations such as diplomatic pressure, the attachment of political conditionalities 
to offers of commercial, financial or other concessions, and sanctions or threat of 
sanctions in the event of non-compliance. ‘Diplomatic pressure’ is an often-used 
term that while something of a black box to onlookers refers to more than just 
‘political dialogue’ and ‘quiet diplomacy’. Conditionalities can be either negative, 
which means a threat of penalties in the event of failing to comply, or positive, in 
which case they resemble incentives. How far the actual conditionalities resemble 
coercion in practice depends in part on the baseline expectations, including any 
sense of entitlements that might normally have been in place, and how con-
strained are the choices facing the party on the receiving end. A positive condi-
tionality can be compelling if the party is desperate and no alternatives are 
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available. Diane Ethier’s (2003, p. 100) notion of pseudo-conditionality adds a 
further twist, describing situations where the targeted party believes the threat of 
penalties is not credible, perhaps because the rewards for compliance are delivered 
early and cannot be reversed. 
The literature on democracy promotion suggests yet further refinements are 
needed to capture the full variety. Thus for example Milada Vachudova (2005) 
analysed EU relations with post-communist states in Central-Eastern Europe 
around a distinction between ‘passive’ and ‘active’ leverage. The first is exercised 
merely by virtue of the EU’s existence and its usual conduct whereas the 
second consists of deliberate interventions. The operation of socialisation 
which features in many accounts of the EU’s approach to promoting democracy 
and human rights has also been dissected. Socialisation can be understood as 
normative suasion but there is also socialisation through strategic calculation, where 
the ‘target’ party conforms to externally indicated norms, rules or standards 
when it reckons the benefits such as greater international stature will 
outweigh the costs of non-conformity, for instance loss of international 
legitimacy. 
 © 2007 The Author. Journal compilation © 2007 Political Studies Association 
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An important point to note in all of this is that instruments and approaches 
employed in promoting democracy are necessarily constitutive of the political 
relationship that the external actors have with countries and with different 
political constituencies within those countries. The implications for the pos-
sibilities of political self-determination by countries can differ quite drastically 
from one approach to another. To illustrate, there is the view that true 
democratisation by definition has to come from within society, or else the 
democracy’s authenticity and legitimacy will be impaired. In many accounts 
the reasoning is more functionalist: processes that are endogenous to the 
society, popular struggle, even, are a necessary condition if the new democracy 
is to stand much chance of being maintained. Democratisation is not something 
that can be done to a people or for a society. And so outside special circum-
stances, attempts to impose democracy from outside might be doomed to fail. 
Historical surveys of US military intervention by Mark Peceny (1999) and 
Minxin Pei and Sara Kasper (2003) support this inference, as does much of the 
record of European decolonisation in Africa. Afghanistan and Iraq now seem to 
offer further confirmation. Democracy assistance projects of the most consensual 
kind appear much less liable to be self-limiting in this way.4 Democracy 
promotion strategies that fall somewhere between the soft and hard ends of the 
power continuum are the most difficult to call in terms of their compatibility 
with democratic self-determination. But it is worth bearing in mind that 
although the argument for a double shift might address weaknesses that have 
been identified in the policy processes of the democracy promoters and facilitate 
more effective strategies, the promoters’ perspective must also take account of the 
implications different approaches have for political self-determination and 
hence for the end of democratic self-rule. 
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The Double Shift 
The reasoning behind a double shift from activities to instruments and from past 
performance to future policy is not revolutionary although the context is new. 
Over twenty years ago an experienced aid manager concluded about economic 
development assistance, ‘One lesson I consider that we have learnt from the 
conduct of evaluations is the importance of the initial appraisal ... One cannot 
over-stress the importance of a very careful, if necessarily lengthy, appraisal of the 
project before you actually agree to take it on’ (Browning, 1984, pp. 138–9). The 
advantage is self-evident: why risk having to shut the stable door after the horse 
has bolted if forethought could prevent mistakes in the first place? Where appraisal 
has been so negligent that it fails to specify policy goals and measures clearly then 
attempts to assess the performance later will be blighted anyway. Sound appraisals 
of strategy towards democracy promotion are crucially important to help mini-
mise the potentially high costs of avoidable policy failure. Such costs should be 
calculated not just in terms of money squandered or, even, damage to the 
democracy promoter’s reputation, but the dashed hopes and disappointments in 
societies where people cherished hopes that international involvement would 
help them achieve greater freedom and democracy. An increase in punitive 
reprisals of the kind that repressive regimes visit on their political opponents and pro-
democracy activists may add to the cost. A different manifestation of democratic 
collateral damage arises when international sanctions that undermine autocracy 
also depress the socio-economic conditions essential to stable liberal democracy. 
Of course the first part of the double shift, from ex post to ex ante, does not mean 
evaluations can or should be substituted by appraisal. On the contrary,just as Basil 
Cracknell (2000, p. 146) concluded from great experience in development aid 
that evaluations can help counter the undue ‘appraisal optimism’ found among 
development planners pushing their favourite schemes, so appraisal could help 
counter the evaluation pessimism encountered among democracy assistance prac-
titioners impressed by the problems besetting accurate measurement of the results 
of their activities. They know how high the hurdle called the ‘significance test’ 
can be. Judgements about democracy assistance’s impact that try to take in 
unintended and future consequences are bound to be more speculative than 
commenting on a project’s more narrowly defined objectives or expenditures 
alone. And yet impact is what matters most in the long run. As exercises, then, 
both appraisals and evaluations are important: the value to be gained from the 
second is enhanced where the findings can be compared rigorously with findings 
from investigating other ways of promoting democracy and when the conclusions 
inform the policy process. This is nothing more than a dynamic perspective on 
the assessment procedure (Carlsson et al., 1994, p. 11). 
The significance for goal achievement of the second part of the double shift, 
from assistance to promotion, can be illustrated by posing some questions. If the 
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various instruments ranged along the continuum of power and which writers 
have dichotomised into linkage versus leverage and soft versus hard power, can 
be employed in different combinations or used sequentially, then how do we 
know which options will work best and under what conditions? For example, 
when does a decision to invoke democratic conditionalities offer greater 
promise than investing funds in some form of democracy assistance, or what 
will be the optimum mix? Take for instance the EU’s approach to employing 
‘active leverage’ prior to accession by new member states, supplemented by 
processes of socialisation into democratic norms and practices acting once 
the full force of leverage has obsolesced. Kelley (2006, pp. 41–8) is right 
to question whether a strategy of this sort will work in respect of countries 
now being offered economic incentives by the EU’s new European Neigh-
bourhood Policy without prospect of accession, in return for making demo-
cratic progress. 
Furthermore, although the seemingly simple distinction between democracy 
assistance and all other approaches to promoting democracy superficially aligns 
with the organisational distinction between democracy foundations or related 
bodies such as the NED, NDI, IRI, IMD,WFD and Stiftungen on the one side and 
governmental departments and intergovernmental organisations on the other, it 
can easily lose purchase, for two reasons. 
First, clear-cut analytical distinctions between forms of power and influence 
including those between the different versions of conditionalities can become 
muddy in practice. A particular relationship may be interpreted differently by 
the different parties. For instance what one side offers as dialogue or incentive 
certain partners may perceive as a form of pressure, perhaps a ‘throffer’, 
which contains an implied threat. Conditionality might be received as 
‘pseudo-conditionality’, contrary to intentions. In communications between 
democratic and authoritarian regimes, misunderstandings abound. Even where 
one party has little option but to agree to the conditionalities that are indicated 
by the other there may be no agreement over how this situation came about. 
So, by denying responsibility, or, perhaps, claiming to operate in accord with 
international law, the democracy promoter admits only to trying to influence 
whereas the recipient views the relationship more like a coercive form of 
power. 
 © 2007 The Author. Journal compilation © 2007 Political Studies Association 
POLITICAL STUDIES: 2007 
Secondly, the different approaches to promoting democracy do not function 
independently of one another and democracy promoters seek to take advantage 
of the interactions especially when dealing with authoritarian and semi-
authoritarian regimes. Thus in Levitsky and Way’s (2005) reasoning, ‘linkage’ 
draws strength by enhancing the opportunities for ‘leverage’: the two are not 
mutually exclusive alternatives. ‘Leverage’ alone is deemed unlikely to change 
competitive authoritarian regimes into sustainable democracies. Conversely 
linkage without leverage will not transform autocracies presiding over closed 
societies, North Korea for example. And contrasting with Vachudova’s (2005, p. 
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259) claim that the EU’s ‘active leverage’ derives its effectiveness from ‘passive 
leverage’ there is much talk now about how America’s ‘soft power’ around the 
world is being degraded by its deployment of hard power in the Middle East. 
Even the seemingly soft option of providing democracy assistance to pro-
democracy activists can be perceived by the power holders as a serious personal 
threat. That explains why in many countries the authorities are now pursuing 
imaginative counter-strategies to cut down, contain and neutralise the inter-
national support being offered to civil society, however exaggerated may be 
their estimate of the society’s potential to force radical change. 
In reality assistance to human rights advocacy groups, democracy demonstrators 
and, even, democratically inclined political parties is far from beingjust a 
technical or bureaucratic approach. It may be no less political than is diplomatic 
pressure on governments to relax the restrictions on such freedoms as political 
association, organisation and expression. All these efforts are very much part of that 
conflict between interests and values and between the power holders and the rest as 
well any conflicts among power holders and among reformers, from which the 
struggle for political change takes its character, and which will determine whether 
change becomes self-sustaining. The effects of support and of pressure can 
resemble one another; the two approaches can be complementary, mutually 
serving halves of what might be called a ‘nutcracker approach’.Just such a unified 
approach forms part of what Carothers (1997; 2004) means by a more strategic 
approach to promoting democracy. However, we do not know for certain that it 
will work better than the alternatives. 
Nevertheless the literature does give some confidence that broad-based com-
parative assessments of different approaches to promoting democracy offer a 
practicable way of informing strategic thinking and policy appraisal. To 
mention but two examples in a growing body of scholarship, Ethier (2003) 
sought to compare the results of conditionality and incentives as democracy 
promotion strategies in the EU’s negotiations with prospective members, while 
Kelley (2004) compared the effectiveness of conditionality and socialisation-
based methods used by the EU, Council of Europe and Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe in efforts to improve the status of national 
minorities in post-communist countries. But neither pretended to assess the 
relative contributions available to the two sides of the ‘nutcracker’ approach, let 
alone measure that against the effects of socialisation, however defined. 
Vachudova’s (2005) study comes closest to doing that. She attached greater 
weight to the consequences of EU empowerment of local reform activists, 
through ‘active leverage’, than to the pressure exerted on recalcitrant govern-
ments. However even these findings were drawn just from limited EU expe-
rience. None of these or similar studies denies the existence of considerable 
unfilled scope to do more comparative analysis of democracy promotion strat-
egies, that will draw on a wider body of evidence and improve the defective 
policy status quo. However, the challenge will not be easy. 
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No Easy Challenge 
A methodological framework for appraising strategies for promoting democracy 
must cope with several sets of variables. Because the contents of each set contain 
alternatives where there are significant qualitative differences and no standard 
metrics, comparative assessments are unlikely to be straightforward. 
First, there are the inputs into democracy promotion. These include: money; 
managerial ability; organisational expertise; professional competence; technical 
know-how; insights from political science; diplomatic skills; what President Bush 
calls ‘political capital’; trust or social capital among partners; military intelligence; 
and the ability to make credible threats and a capacity to coerce. In addition to 
such resources, all of which have played some part in attempts to promote 
democracy, there is the more passive side of international influence, where 
democracy effects have occurred but were not intended. Much of Nye’s (2005) 
idea of soft power probably works in this way.It is not obvious how rates of return 
to the different inputs to active promotion of democracy could be compared 
scientifically. There is no common unit of value for measuring them. Moreover 
whereas some of the inputs must be regarded as consumables that are used up in 
the exercise, like money spent, other inputs could be self-generating and actually 
accumulate through use. In certain circumstances an exercise of power or influence 
begets yet more of the same, whereas different circumstances will see the stock 
drawn down. 
Second, there are the different tools, instruments or approaches. Assigning individual 
responsibility for an outcome to just one category of these, a particular form of 
leverage, say, is tricky when as is often the case different approaches are used 
together, by democracy promoters individually or collectively. The problem is 
mitigated where the different approaches are aimed at different objects. But 
even that does not exclude the possibility that there will be external effects. A 
further problem arises when trying to compare the approaches. Just how do you 
compare the effectiveness of: assistance intended to transfer formal institutional 
models; measures such as conditionalities whose purpose is to secure behavioural 
change; attempts to bring about social learning or a shift in norms, values and 
beliefs; and interventions directed at altering more directly the dynamics of group 
struggle for political power? Analysts must determine what weight to attach to 
changes at the elite level vis-à-vis those that involve greater numbers of ordinary 
people, and the relevant time horizons. 
 
Third, because the situations where democracy promoters are actively engaged 
vary so greatly, differences among the objective possibilities and among actual 
policy objectives are similarly diverse and hard to compare, at least in the short to 
medium terms. So questions about what works or will work should be treated as 
several distinct questions, catering for democracy recovery and advance, for 
challenging a well-established autocracy and preventing regression towards 
authoritarian rule, for furthering transition to democracy and helping new 
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democracies consolidate or become more democratic. It may be unreasonable to 
expect just one set of indicators to do all the work of capturing performance. A 
more realistic course would be to devise functionally equivalent sets of non-
identical indicators for the purpose of comparison, while at the same time taking 
account of differences in the degree of difficulty or magnitude of the challenge. 
Post-conflict situations for instance could merit a special weighting. Indicators of 
achievement can be made sensitive to the fact that even authoritarian regimes 
vary in respect of whether they enjoy some measure of legitimacy among their 
citizens and do not rely on force and fear alone. The differences in the sources 
from which they derive that legitimacy, of which nationalist hostility to external 
political interference is one example, is a secondary consideration, but it too could 
be accommodated. Thus persuading a hereditary ruler to order some limited 
political opening might be reckoned to be less daunting than convincing a highly 
bureaucratic regime to change. The democracy promoters’ ideas of success and 
failure as well the actual prospects of achieving success should relate to local 
context, and in turn find reflection in the structure of assessment. Similarly the 
way threats to democratic sustainability, the countermeasures and their effectiveness 
are identified can factor in the different vulnerabilities between fragile new and 
stronger, longer-established democracies (Brimmer, 2005, p. 254). Sound 
appraisals of democracy promotion should anticipate that similar approaches will 
produce different results in different political environments. And the way that 
given or expected results are interpreted and their apparent significance will very 
likely differ too. 
All things considered, the conclusion Finkel et al. (2006, p. 84) arrive at from 
evaluating USAID assistance applies every bit as much to international influence 
on democratisation and its assessment: there is still ‘much that social scientists do 
not yet know about how democracy grows or is eroded’. And yet in the 
progression of endeavour from devising better ways of evaluating forms of 
democracy assistance to assessing the other ways of promoting democracy and, 
finally, to making broad-based comparisons, some building blocks have already 
been laid.At the lowest course, the next steps could include refining the definition 
of what counts as democracy assistance and comparing more closely the perfor-
mance of individual sub-sectors, such as support to civil society and to legislatures, 
or specific combinations and sequences of sub-sectoral support. Given that prior 
to Finkel et al. ’s research USAID was tending to do fewer programme 
evaluations as its democracy expenditures grew and UNDP’s Democratic 
Governance Group does not evaluate its own activities, improvement should be 
easy: more and increasingly sophisticated evaluations, winnowing out activities 
that are freely admitted to have been wrongly labelled as democracy assistance in 
order to inflate the appearance. The dividing line with governance projects is 
especially confused. 
At the next level, assessing democracy promotion more broadly, again some 
foundations already exist, most notably in the substantial literature on the EU. 
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There are also several recent studies of individual countries and studies of 
distinctive types of regime where a focal point of political inquiry has been the 
impact of external factors (examples are Åslund and McFaul, 2006 on Ukraine; 
Adesnik and McFaul, 2006 on the US’s autocratic allies). Historical process 
tracing is one of the methods used. Finally much could be gained by revisiting the 
established international relations literature examining the record of similar 
instruments of influence and power used in pursuit of objectives other than 
democracy promotion, so long as the limits to transferability of knowledge to the 
democracy promotion arena are recognised. The experience of economic sanc-
tions for instance has been studied in a variety of situations, from combating 
apartheid in South Africa to trying to unseat Cuba’s President Castro. Bringing 
all the information together in a structured way so as to enable systematic and 
meaningful comparison of lessons for democracy promotion is feasible. Exploring 
the potential of simple modelling techniques to comprehend the findings may 
provide a method, although in combining the benefits of both quantitative and 
qualitative or case study research the relative weightings would still have to be 
decided. But if economists can create an economic production function out of a 
mixture of capital, labour and land then it may not be fanciful to envision an 
international democracy promotion production function formulated along 
similar lines. And if the sort of collective action problem that formerly held back 
investment in finding ways of gauging the performance of democracy promotion 
is now reducing, because of increasing interest from both supporters and oppo-
nents of democracy promotion, then attention naturally turns to the question of 
who will do it. 
Beyond In-House Assessment 
No single organisation has the capability to review democracy promotion tout 
court. The devising and executing of methodologies for assessing democracy 
support can be done on as multinational a basis as are the activities themselves. 
The available academic capital could be exploited more heavily in the democracy 
promotion policy process, alongside the growing number of independent think 
tanks and policy research institutes with relevant expertise.5 One of the most 
intriguing issues is how far participant methods of assessment involving ‘stake-
holders’ in countries ‘targeted’ by democracy promotion can be embedded in the 
process. 
One view is that the purpose of assessing activities directed at supporting 
democratisation is not simply to learn how to do things better or, even, to make 
practitioners more accountable to the politicians and taxpayers who authorise and 
fund their work. Instead the point should be to exercise, display and share the 
democratic ethos. Assessment itself becomes a tool of socialisation into demo-
cratic values, by setting an example and through the chosen methods of involvement. 
The aim is to establish shared ownership of both process and results. The act of 
evaluation becomes an act of democratisation (Crawford, 2003, p. 17). It 
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helps democratise the relationship between ‘donor’ and ‘recipient’, compelling 
both sides to commit more fully to such values as inclusiveness and mutual respect. 
In its more technical aspect it can be an exercise in capacity building in demo-
cratic governance too. The procedures for designing, implementing and analysing the 
results from assessments and for evaluating the assessment process itself may all be 
fashioned to reflect these high ambitions. In the words of the Swedish 
International Development Cooperation Agency (2004, p. 19), participatory 
evaluation expresses the right for ordinary people to have a voice in matters that 
significantly affect their interest. If this is so important to assessing economic 
development cooperation then its relevance to external efforts to promote 
democracy can hardly be overstated. Indeed for Gordon Crawford (2003, pp. 8–
10) democracy assistance misses both an opportunity and a democratic obligation 
if informed local actors do not control the impact evaluation and if their knowledge 
and understanding are not incorporated as key components. The fact that certain 
approaches to promoting democracy involve some measure of coercion, coupled 
with the idea that democratisation is not something that can be imposed from 
outside, suggests that the role of assessing democracy promotion cannot be left to 
the democracy promoters. As the construction of assessment methodologies must 
bear some relation to the policies and the methods for promoting democracy then 
the case for participant appraisal of strategies begins to look unassailable. 
However that is easier said than done. 
For one thing there are objections even in respect of institutionalising participatory 
approaches to the evaluation of democracy assistance (see Green and Kohl, 2007). 
Local partners might be reluctant to ‘bite the hand that feeds them’. Non-
partners might offer a more independent evaluation but could be influenced by 
resentment at having been excluded from projects and programmes or simple 
ignorance. In conducting evaluations the answers you get may still depend on 
precisely who is asked, as well as who sets the questions and who does the asking. 
But if for these reasons participatory assessment of democracy assistance is still fairly 
unusual, then no-one has even inquired whether it could be made feasible for 
democracy promotion appraisal, notwithstanding the potential significance if 
external shows of power really can be self-limiting as ways of helping a country 
become more democratic, and if democratic legitimacy and sustain-ability 
depend on ownership that must come from within. 
There is no obvious answer to the question ‘who should do appraisal?’ once we 
move away from the more consensual world of democracy assistance to more 
politically contentious approaches to promoting democracy like conditionalities, 
threats of sanctions and forms of pressure. The ‘primary stakeholder’ of democ-
racy promotion is society, but society as such cannot be asked. If the public was 
free to undertake a credible participatory appraisal of strategies aimed at promot-
ing democracy in their country, then democracy promotion from outside would 
not be necessary. Barometric surveys that establish popular attitudes about 
democracy’s condition are one thing, and some of these receive support from 
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democracy assistance budgets like USAID’s. But informed judgements about the 
comparative merits of different strategies for promoting democracy require a 
different order of reflection. The diplomatic manoeuvring involved in such 
activities is often shrouded in secrecy and hard to appreciate. Nevertheless there 
have been some examples of oppressed peoples signalling their informal ‘consent’ 
to being the victims of double jeopardy, where they believed that the punishing 
imposition of measures like foreign investment embargoes could help bring down 
their oppressors and judged the resulting misery in the interim would be bearable. 
The informal support that black South Africans voiced for sanctions against the 
apartheid state in the 1980s is an example that lent moral authority to interna-
tional sanctions at that time. There have also been numerous cases of pro-
democracy activists lobbying international donors to suspend or withdraw their 
development aid support, where the benefits were seen to accrue primarily to the 
government or regime. Evidence of this sort can, and presumably sometimes does, 
enter into the democracy promoters’ reflections on strategy, although it is not the 
kind of information that tells us which approaches to promoting democracy will 
be most effective. And although leading political opponents of an authoritarian 
government might be best placed to offer the nearest thing to an ‘expert’ opinion 
on that, the dangers such as being branded unpatriotic and arrested as traitors 
could be a deterrent. The opinions of any who are enjoying political asylum 
abroad may be out of touch with the realities on the ground, and they may not 
be authentic representatives. Ahmed Chalabi’s misleading advice to the US 
government about what would happen in Iraq after the forcible removal of 
Saddam Hussein is testament. Consultations by senior figures in countries or 
organisations promoting democracy with regime opponents who are personal 
friends may not be characterised by the tension that could exist between ‘goal-
oriented’ appraisal and ‘user-oriented’ evaluation, but they are a long way from full 
participatory assessment. The potential for conflict between foreign supply-
driven and local demand-led approaches to democracy assistance, which even 
some practitioners regard as a serious concern, at its worst may cast doubt on the 
compatibility with democratisation of something more fundamental than dis-
agreements over approaches to promoting democracy, namely competing visions 
of the democratic end itself. 
The high-level debates going on in the US about how to obtain good ‘intelli-
gence’ on politics inside foreign countries, following the serious intelligence 
failures over Iraq and continuing absence of stable democracy there, illustrate 
many of these points. But the challenge of preventing debacles happening else-
where requires going beyond amassing more reliable information and accurate 
analysis. For good policy appraisal these materials must find their way into the 
policy-making process. If a more joined-up approach that links ex post assessment of 
assistance and ex ante appraisal of democracy promotion strategies is actually to 
benefit strategy, then a key element must involve an institutional solution. The 
absence of bridges or feedback ‘loops’ between democracy support practitioners 
on the one side and the policy-makers is probably no less damaging than is 
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the ‘attribution gap’ that signifies the difficulty of proving causal connections 
between known assistance inputs and observed outcomes. The dilemma is com-
pounded by the resistance of leading democracy promoters to sharing strategic 
thinking about their activities. And the presence of ‘firewalls’ that help the 
democracy foundations operate at arms’ length from the official bodies that fund 
their activities adds yet one more inter-organisational dimension to the institu-
tional barriers inside governments and intergovernmental bureaucracies that 
impede knowledge transfer and institutional learning on democracy promotion. 
Firm connections downstream from the appraisal/reappraisal of ways to promote 
democracy to the evaluations of democracy assistance and upstream to high-level 
deliberations on the very policy goal of promoting democracy are necessary if 
strategic thinking is to be kept under review. Recent developments in the US and 
EU suggest some appreciation of this point. In the former the reorganised 
intelligence community has been directed to conduct more analysis of 
democracy-related activities and extend its outreach to academic specialists. 
Moves are well under way to integrate the aid planning, coordination and 
implementation mechanisms of USAID and the Department of State. In the EU a 
report commissioned by the European Parliament (NIMD, 2005, pp. 23–31) 
makes extensive suggestions for institutional reforms to improve the capacity for 
strategic decision-making on democracy and human rights support. These 
include for instance an Advisory Committee mandated to offer recommendations 
to all three: the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament. 
While it is too early to predict the outcome of such developments they are 
certainly not without risk. Historically in international development cooperation a 
familiar argument for exposing projects and programmes to rigorous ex post 
evaluation is to insulate the professional management from disruptive interference 
by self-seeking political and commercial lobbies. In democracy promotion a 
free-moving transmission belt from assistance evaluations to policy appraisals 
should be accompanied by safeguards that monitor flows travelling in the reverse 
direction and render assistance practitioners vulnerable to misguided political 
interference. Such an out-turn would contradict, not serve the aim of bringing 
value to assessments by feeding their findings into more broadly based attempts to 
appraise democracy promotion in advance. The risk is hardly academic.Attempts 
to align more closely the activities of USAID and the State Department have 
triggered some contrasting anxieties in Washington circles: USAID’s economic 
development cooperation could lose credibility if political objectives are thought 
to gain the upper hand; and democracy promotion will be tarnished by percep-
tions that it is being tied more closely to narrow US security interests. In Europe, 
where a campaign to establish a new European Foundation for Democracy 
through Partnership has support from the President of the European Commission 
there are concerns that such a proposal could yet fall foul of the ‘strategic realism 
and alliance-building’ that has so coloured EU democracy support in the past 
(Youngs, 2006, p. 24). 
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Conclusion 
Recent endeavours to improve the assessment of democracy assistance are com-
mendable. Closer specification of the variables and substantial investment in 
data recovery would contribute further momentum. The case for being even 
more ambitious, incorporating the assessment findings into more considered, 
systematic and wide-ranging appraisals of different approaches to promoting 
democracy has been framed here by a statement of the potential benefits. Not 
just among their critics but even inside the democracy promotion organisations 
there is an acknowledgement that we do not know enough about what works, 
and why. There is a shared recognition that democracy promotion policy could 
be more effective if it was informed by a better understanding. The rationale 
for making the effort is to be found in the ultimate goals that are posited for 
democracy promotion. These can be couched in terms of democracy as a good 
in itself and because of the instrumental worth that democratisation may have 
for human development generally, the promotion of the UN’s Millennium 
Development Goals particularly and the returns to development aid specifically. If 
the prospects for international peace and security among nations are also 
enhanced in a world of democracies, then aspiring to more effective strategies for 
democracy promotion becomes even more worthwhile. Debates about the policy 
goal of democracy promotion should also benefit from sound appraisal. The fact 
that the strategies for promoting democracy are constitutive of political 
relationships with countries such that different strategies have different 
implications for the possibilities of democratic self-determination certainly 
merits closer consideration. 
Although assistance evaluations may aim to realise some of the advantages 
claimed for participatory assessment, making the appraisal of democracy pro-
motion policy more participatory seems much more problematical. This under-
lines the importance of making a full inventory of the benefits and costs of the 
different approaches to promoting democracy and bringing the findings of 
comparative analysis into the policy-making process. Neither the methodological 
difficulties, some of them generic to social science and unlikely to be solved by 
democracy practitioners on their own, nor the institutional obstacles should be 
underestimated. Nevertheless some major players in democracy promotion now 
show some awareness that new or more strategic approaches to decision-making 
are required if they are to promote democracy successfully in what is generally 
seen as an increasingly challenging environment. The willingness to commission 
more research on assessment is a healthy sign, as are the growing exchanges between 
those who work in democracy promotion and others who merely study it. Some 
building blocks for the comparative examination of different approaches to 
doing democracy promotion already exist. Now the agenda should be pursued 
more systematically, in a more integrated fashion and with greater coverage. 
However it remains to be seen whether institutional changes involving the 
democracy promotion actors themselves really will 
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 convert the potential benefits into a more informed approach to policy-making 
on democracy promotion. And even if that does happen, there is no guarantee 
that the high value benefits claimed for democratisation and so by 
implication for successful democracy promotion will then be achieved. 
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Notes 
1 The meaning and merits of strategy in regard to democracy promotion are elaborated in Burnell (2005, pp. 364–5). 
2 Examples include jointly staged workshops involving North American and European democracy assistance actors 
such as USAID and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency plus a few academics:‘Measuring the 
Impact of Democracy and Governance Assistance’ (The Hague, March 2005); ‘Methods and Experiences of Evaluating 
Democracy Support’ (Stockholm, April 2006); and ‘Evaluating International Efforts at Democracy Promotion: 
Concepts, Measurement and Causality’ (Madrid, June 2006). Non-attributable comments from these and events 
in Washington DC help inform this article. 
3 Finkel et al.(2006) concluded from examining USAID democracy and governance aid to all countries over 
1990–2003 that US$10 million additional dollars would produce a five-fold increase in the amount of democratic 
change that the average country could be expected to achieve, ceteris paribus, in any given year. 
4 In its new ‘Strategic Framework’, US Agency for International Development (2005, p. 3) says,‘We recognize that 
democracy must be home-grown. Thus, the centrepiece of our efforts remains our strong and enduring partnership 
with local actors’. 
5 Leading examples are the private, non-profit, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, whose Thomas 
Carothers (2006) gave evidence to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing on responding to the 
democracy promotion backlash, and in Europe the Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo 
Exterio (FRIDE), an institutional member of the Club of Madrid. FRIDE’s Youngs was lead author of the 
strategy paper on democracy and human rights support commissioned by the European Parliament (NIMD, 
2005). 
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